Secure Hash Algorithm 3

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Almost everything you do online uses a hash function

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Passwords

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- Passwords
- Site certificates

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- Site certificates
- Message authentication

"Any function that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to data of a fixed size"

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SHA-256[My] ->

8ed6791bdf3d61a1e6edcbb253979b0a6bef7f3d99dda0fb49cffe96923514b6

SHA-256[My name is Courtney] ->

543ab313f11d6316f84438e074964058613ffa595f1494f81eeafad23364b7cb

SHA-256, www.movable-type.co.uk

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SHA-256[My name is Courtnet] ->

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HASH[Pay me \$30] = HASH[You owe me \$50] \leftarrow collision!

SHA-256, www.movable-type.co.uk

Outline

- Background
 - History
 - Operators
 - Notation
 - Liner Feedback Shift Registers
 - Padding
- Base Construction
- Inner Workings
- Conclusion



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SHA3 - 2015, chosen via competition.





XOR (\oplus) : Adding bits modulo 2

0011

⊕0101

=0110

XOR (⊕) : Adding bits modulo 2

AND (△) : Multiplying bits modulo 2

0011 0011 ⊕0101 ∧0101 =0110 =0001

XOR (\oplus) : Adding bits modulo 2

AND (∧) : Multiplying bits modulo 2

NOT (\neg) : Bit flipping

 \neg (0011)

0011 ⊕0101 =0110 0011 ∧0101 =0001

101 =1100



Working in set of all strings of 0s and 1s $(\varepsilon, 0, 1, 0010101, 100001, etc)$

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Truncating M to its first ℓ bits is $\lfloor M \rfloor_{\ell}$. $(|10110100|_4 = 1011)$

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
Truncating M to its first ℓ bits is $\lfloor M \rfloor_{\ell}$. (|10110100|₄ = 1011)

A series of n 0s or 1s will be written 0^n or 1^n So 111100 can be written 1^40^2 If the number of bits is unknown, we'll use 0^* or 1^*

Liner Feedback Shift Registers are given as polynomial

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LFSR 100

Output

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LFSR	Output
100	- -
110	0

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LFSR	Outpu
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Padding

Hash functions work with a specific block size



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Protect against extension attacks

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Multi-rate padding : input = M||10*1

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The number of 0s depends on how many are needed to complete a block.

0110011 with a block size of 4 becomes

0110|011 0110|0111|0001



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Transformation *f*, padding, and the bitrate r (and capacity c) r+c=length of state s




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Variable input and output length, but fixed-length transformation

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Absorbing: XOR r-length blocks into *s*, interleaved with the transformation




Transformation f, padding, and the bitrate r (and capacity c) r+c=length of state s

Variable input and output length, but fixed-length transformation

Absorbing: XOR r-length blocks into *s*, interleaved with the transformation

Squeezing: output r-length blocks, interleaving with transformation *f*



Small Example



Small Example

Input: 10010100

f(x): Circular Left Shift by 1 (Shift left by 1 bit)

Block length: 4

Capacity: 2

Output length: 12

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Input: 10010100

f(x): Circular Left Shift by 1 (Shift left by 1 bit)

Block length: 4 Capacity: 2

Output length: 12

Padding:

1001 0100 1001

1001 0100 1001

Absorb:

$$s_0^a = 000000$$

 $s_1^a = s_0^a \oplus 1001||00$

000000

 $\oplus 100100$

=100100

$$s_2^a = f(s_1^a)$$

= $f(100100)$
= 001001



1001<u>0100</u>1001

Absorb:

$$s_2^a = 001001$$

 $s_3^a = s_2^a \oplus 0100||00$

001001 ⊕010000

=011001

$$s_4^a = f(s_3^a)$$

= $f(011001)$

=110010



1001 0100 <u>1001</u>

Absorb:

$$s_4^a = 110010$$

 $s_5^a = s_4^a \oplus 1001 || 00$

$$\begin{array}{r}
110010 \\
\oplus 100100 \\
=010110 \\
s_6^a = f(s_5^a) \\
= f(010110) \\
= 101100
\end{array}$$



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$$Z = \varepsilon$$
$$s_0^s = 101100$$

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$$Z = \varepsilon$$
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$$Z = \lfloor s_0^s \rfloor_4$$

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= f(010110)
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$$Z = \varepsilon$$
 $s_0^s = 101100$

$$Z = \lfloor s_0^s \rfloor_4$$

= 1011
 $s_1^s = f(s_0^s)$
= $f(101100)$
= 011001

1001 0100 1001

Absorb:

$$s_4^a = 110010$$

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$$110010
\oplus 100100
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s_6^a = f(s_5^a)
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$$Z = 1011$$

 $s_1^s = 011001$

$$\begin{split} Z &= Z || \lfloor s_1^s \rfloor_4 \\ &= 1011 |0110 \end{split}$$

1001 0100 1001

Absorb:

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$$Z = Z||[s_1^s]_4$$

= 1011|0110
 $s_2^s = f(s_1^s)$
= $f(011001)$
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$$Z = 1011 | 0110$$

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Squeeze:

$$Z = 1011|0110$$

 $s_2^s = 110010$

$$Z = Z||[s_2^s]_4$$

= 1011|0110|1100

Output: 101101101100

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Consists of n_r rounds of R, where R = $\iota \circ \chi \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta$. $n_r = 12+2\ell$

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Works on state $\alpha = [5][5][w]$

$$w=2^\ell$$

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Keccak-0:

$$\alpha[1][1][1] \rightarrow s[2^0(5*1+1)+1] = s[7]$$

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
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The state of Keccak [Keccak Reference]

Theta

```
FOR x = 0 to 4
    C[x][z] := \alpha[x][0][z]
    FOR y = 1 to 4
       C[x][z] := C[x][z] \oplus \alpha[x][y][z]
   END FOR
END FOR
FOR x = 0 to 4
   D[x][z] := C[x-1][z] \oplus C[x+1][z-1]
   FOR y = 0 to 4
      \alpha[x][y][z] := \alpha[x][y][z] \oplus D[x][z]
   FND FOR
END FOR
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The state is collapsed down into 2 dimensional plane in array C


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For massive diffusion

FOR x = 0 to 4

FOR y = 0 to 4

$$\begin{bmatrix} a \\ b \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\alpha[a][b][z] := \alpha[x][y][z]$$
END FOR
END FOR

Ρi

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Lanes shifted













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Lanes shifted













For long-term diffusion

$$\mathsf{R} = \iota \circ \chi \circ \underline{\rho} \circ \pi \circ \theta.$$

Rho

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
FOR t = 0 to 23
$$\alpha[x][y] := ROT(\alpha[x][y], (t+1)(t+2)/2)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \end{bmatrix}$$
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Every lane is rotated by a function of t:

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So when t = 2, rotate lane at α [2][3] by 6

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So when t = 2, rotate lane at α [2][3] by 6

For inter-slice dispersion

Chi

```
FOR x = 0 to 4

FOR y = 0 to 4

\alpha[x][y] := \alpha[x][y]

\oplus (\neg \alpha[x+1][y] \land \alpha[x+2][y])

END FOR

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NOT of lane in next x spot AND lane two x spots over

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NOT of lane in next x spot AND lane two x spots over XOR with original lane

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NOT of lane in next x spot AND lane two x spots over XOR with original lane

Non-linear

$$\mathsf{R} = \underline{\iota} \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta.$$

$$\alpha$$
[0][0] := α [0][0] \oplus RC_{ir}

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RC_{ir} determined by a Linear Feedback Shift Register

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Changes from round to round Number of non-zero bits is $\ell+1$

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$$\mathsf{R} = \underline{\iota} \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta.$$

 α [0][0] := α [0][0] \oplus RC_{i_r}

RC_{ir} determined by a Linear Feedback Shift Register

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LFSR output is XORed with lane at α [0][0]



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 α [0][0] := α [0][0] \oplus RC_{ir}

RCir determined by a Linear Feedback Shift Register

Changes from round to round Number of non-zero bits is ℓ +1 (Meaning if ℓ =4, there are 16 bits, of which 5 are 1s)

LFSR output is XORed with lane at α [0][0]

To disrupt symmetry



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A user of the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 can decide what trade-offs they want to make (speed vs security)



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Collisions found for SHA1, can be applied to SHA2.



Thank You

Elena Machkasova, advisor



References



G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, G. Van Assche. Cryptographic sponge functions.

SHA-3 competition (round 3), 2011.



G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters, G. Van Assche. The Making of Keccak.

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Questions?

