Searchable Encryption

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- Storage on third party servers \rightarrow potential for exposing this information to others.
- To avoid this, data is often encrypted.
- Needing to decrypt makes things difficult
- The specific security and performance demands of these modern day situations has created a necessity for searchable encryption.

Outline

1 Introduction

2 Background

- Databases and Encryption
- Searchable Encryption

3 Searchable Encryption Schemes

- Dual Dictionary
- Fides
- Janus

4 Conclusions

Databases

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A database can be seen as a structured set of data in the form of a table, with each row containing an entry.

Index	Document
1	Pepperoni Pizza
2	Pepperoni Pineapple Pizza
3	Sausage Pizza
4	Ham Pineapple Pizza

 Queries are instructions that can be sent to a server containing a database.

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- They can be used to add, retrieve (search), update, or delete data within the database, depending on the database's functionality.
- The source of the queries is called the *client*.
- The receiver of the queries is called the *server*.

Background: Encryption

Encryption

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Encryption is the process of encoding information so that only authorized users can access it.

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- Encryption key a string of bits created for encoding and/or decoding information
- Plaintext non-encrypted data
- Ciphertext encrypted data

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Index	Document				
1	Pizza Box 1				
2	Pizza Box 2				
3	Pizza Box 3				
4	Pizza Box 4				

Searchable Encryption

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Searchable encryption is a class of structured encryption.

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Queries are run on the keywords in order to identify what data to operate on.

So, the database might look something like this:

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Keyword	Indexes	Index	Document
pepperoni	1, 2	1	Pizza Box
pineapple	2, 4	2	Pizza Box
sausage	3	3	Pizza Box
ham	4	4	Pizza Box

So, the database might look something like this:

Konword	4	Indexes	1	Index	Document			
Keyword				muex	Document			
pepperoni		1, 2		1	Pizza Box			
pineapple		2, 4		2	Pizza Box			
sausage		3		3	Pizza Box			
ham		4		4	Pizza Box			
Or								
Index	K	Keyword			Document			
1	Pe	Pepperoni			Pizza Box			
2	Pepperoni Pineapple			Pizza Box				
3	Sausage			Pizza Box				
4	Ham Pineapple			Pizza Box				

Searchable encryption necessarily leaks some amount of information.

Searchable encryption necessarily leaks some amount of information.

This leakage has been shown to allow:

- leakage-abuse attacks
- full plaintext recovery of encrypted databases

Background: Forward Privacy

Forward Privacy:

・ロ ・ < 回 ・ < 目 ・ < 目 ・ < 目 ・ 目 の Q (*) 27/144 Forward Privacy:

A searchable encryption scheme is said to be forward private if queries to the server don't reveal which keywords are involved in the keyword/document pairs.

Backward Privacy:

Backward Privacy:

A searchable encryption scheme is backward private if search queries on the database don't reveal information about documents that were deleted.

This can be classified in 3 different levels

An example with pizza:

• (T1) add to index 1, pepperoni pineapple pizza

- (T1) add to index 1, pepperoni pineapple pizza
- (T2) add to index 2, pepperoni pizza

- (T1) add to index 1, pepperoni pineapple pizza
- (T2) add to index 2, pepperoni pizza
- (T3) remove from index 1, pepperoni topping

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If there is a search for pepperoni:

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If there is a search for pepperoni:

I. Backward privacy with insertion pattern:

leaks the documents currently matching a keyword, when they were inserted, and the total number of updates on the keyword.

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- index 1 matches the keyword pepperoni
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- three updates occurred for pepperoni

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If there is a search for pepperoni:

II. Backward privacy with update pattern:

when all the updates on the keyword happened

- index 1 matches the keyword pepperoni
- the time at which this entry was added
- three updates occurred for pepperoni and the time
- the time the three updates for pepperoni occurred

An example with pizza:

- (T1) add to index 1, pepperoni pineapple pizza
- (T2) add to index 2, pepperoni pizza
- (T3) remove from index 1, pepperoni topping
- (T4) add to index 3, pineapple pizza

If there is a search for pepperoni:

III. Weak backward privacy:

which deletion update canceled which insertion update.

- index 1 matches the keyword pepperoni
- the time at which this entry was added
- three updates occurred for pepperoni and the time
- the time the three updates for pepperoni occurred
- the time index 1 had pepperoni removed from it

Searchable Encryption Schemes

Dual Dictionary

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The dual dictionary scheme, proposes a new data structure to handle indexes, called dual dictionary.

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The dual dictionary data structure consists of linked dictionaries for inverted and forward indexes

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The dual dictionary data structure consists of linked dictionaries for inverted and forward indexes

- Inverted index: maintains lists of documents per keyword
- Forward index: maintains lists of keywords per document

How it works:

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The client uses encryption keys to create labels for the data stored in the database.

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- Delete Label DL
- Search Label SL

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- Delete Label DL
- Search Label SL

Delete Label - DL

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- created for every keyword matching a document
- generated using a key corresponding to the document
- client keeps a count of how many there are per document

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 $pizza - 1 - DL_1$

generated using the key for index 1 and the number 1, because it is the first keyword of the first pizza

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For a pepperoni pineapple pizza being added to an empty database: We would generate 2 DL's

 $pizza - 1 - DL_1$

generated using the key for index 1 and the number 1, because it is the first keyword of the first pizza

 $pizza - 1 - DL_2$

generated using the key for index 1 and the number 2, because it is the second keyword of the first pizza

Search Label - SL

Search Label - SL

- created for every document matching a given keyword
- generated using a key corresponding to the keyword
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Search Label - SL

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Search Label - SL

- created for every document matching a given keyword
- generated using a key corresponding to the keyword
- client keeps a count of how many there are per keyword

For the pepperoni pineapple pizza: We would then generate 2 SL's pepperoni $-SL_1$

lacksquare generated using the key for pepperoni and the number lacksquare

Search Label - SL

- created for every document matching a given keyword
- generated using a key corresponding to the keyword
- client keeps a count of how many there are per keyword

For the pepperoni pineapple pizza: We would then generate 2 SL's pepperoni – SL_1

 $\hfill generated using the key for pepperoni and the number <math display="inline">1$ pineapple – SL_1

 ${\scriptstyle \bullet}$ generated using the key for pineapple and the number 1

These labels are stored in two dictionaries. As a pair, (DL_i, SL_i) , in Dic_1 As a triplet with a document index, $(SL_i, (DL_i, \text{ index}))$, in Dic_2 These labels are stored in two dictionaries. As a pair, (DL_i, SL_i) , in Dic_1

As a triplet with a document index, $(SL_i, (DL_i, index))$, in Dic_2

		DL	SL
Dic	-1	$pizza - 1 - DL_1$	pepperoni – SL_1
		pizza — 1 — DL ₂	pineapple – SL_1
Dic ₂	SL		(DL, Index)
	pepperoni – SL ₁		$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
	pineapple – SL_1		$(pizza - 1 - DL_2, 1)$

SL
$_1$ pepperoni – SL ₁
1 pepperoni – SL ₂
$_2$ pineapple – SL ₁
$_1$ sausage – SL ₁
$_1$ ham – SL ₁
$_2$ pineapple – SL ₂
(<i>DL</i> , Index)
$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
$(pizza - 2 - DL_1, 2)$
$(pizza - 2 - DL_2, 2)$
$(pizza - 4 - DL_2, 4)$
$(pizza - 3 - DL_1, 3)$
$(pizza - 4 - DL_1, 4)$

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Deleting a document (pizza) with index 2:

 calculate *DL*'s for however many keywords the document has (in this case: 2)

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- search Dic₁ for the DL's (in this case: pizza 2 DL₁, pizza - 2 - DL₂)

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- search Dic₁ for the DL's (in this case: pizza 2 DL₁, pizza - 2 - DL₂)

DL	SL
$pizza - 1 - DL_1$	$pepperoni - SL_1$
pizza — 2 — DL ₁	pepperoni – SL ₂
pizza — 2 — DL ₂	$pineapple - SL_1$
$pizza - 3 - DL_1$	sausage – SL ₁
$pizza - 4 - DL_1$	$ham - SL_1$
pizza — 4 — DL ₂	pineapple – SL_2

- calculate *DL*'s for however many keywords the document has (in this case: 2)
- search Dic₁ for the DL's (in this case: pizza 2 DL₁, pizza - 2 - DL₂)

DL	SL
$pizza - 1 - DL_1$	$pepperoni - SL_1$
$pizza - 2 - DL_1$	pepperoni – SL ₂
$pizza - 2 - DL_2$	pineapple – SL ₁
$pizza - 3 - DL_1$	sausage – SL ₁
$pizza - 4 - DL_1$	$ham - SL_1$
pizza — 4 — DL ₂	pineapple – SL_2

Deleting a document (pizza) with index 2: We would then use the result to identify which SL's to look for in Dic_2 .

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We would then use the result to identify which SL's to look for in Dic_2 .

SL	(DL, Index)
pepperoni – SL_1	$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
pepperoni – SL ₂	(<i>pizza</i> – 2 – <i>DL</i> ₁ , 2)
pineapple – SL_1	(<i>pizza</i> – 2 – <i>DL</i> ₂ , 2)
pineapple – SL_2	$(pizza - 4 - DL_2, 4)$
sausage – SL ₁	$(pizza - 3 - DL_1, 3)$
ham — SL ₁	$(pizza - 4 - DL_1, 4)$

Deleting a document (pizza) with index 2:

We would then use the result to identify which SL's to look for in Dic_2 .

SL	(DL, Index)
pepperoni - SL ₁	$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
pepperoni – SL ₂	(<i>pizza</i> – 2 – <i>DL</i> ₁ , 2)
pineapple – SL ₁	(<i>pizza</i> – 2 – <i>DL</i> ₂ , 2)
pineapple – SL ₂	$(pizza - 4 - DL_2, 4)$
sausage – SL ₁	$(pizza - 3 - DL_1, 3)$
ham — SL ₁	$(pizza - 4 - DL_1, 4)$

Then all the results from Dic_1 , Dic_2 , and the document would be deleted.

Retrieving documents (pizzas) with keyword (topping) pineapple:

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the client calculates SL_i for however many documents match pineapple (in this case: 2)

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- the client calculates SL_i for however many documents match pineapple (in this case: 2)
- search Dic₂ for the SL's (in this case: pineapple SL₁, pineapple SL₂)

SL	(DL, Index)
pepperoni - SL ₁	$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
pepperoni – SL ₂	$(pizza - 2 - DL_1, 2)$
pineapple – SL_1	$(pizza - 2 - DL_2, 2)$
pineapple – SL ₂	$(pizza - 4 - DL_2, 4)$
sausage – SL ₁	$(pizza - 3 - DL_1, 3)$
ham — SL ₁	$(pizza - 4 - DL_1, 4)$

Retrieving documents (pizzas) with keyword (topping) pineapple:

- the client calculates SL_i for however many documents match pineapple (in this case: 2)
- search Dic₂ for the SL's (in this case: pineapple SL₁, pineapple SL₂)

SL	(<i>DL</i> , Index)
pepperoni – SL_1	$(pizza - 1 - DL_1, 1)$
pepperoni – SL ₂	$(pizza - 2 - DL_1, 2)$
pineapple – SL ₁	(<i>pizza</i> – 2 – <i>DL</i> ₂ , 2)
pineapple – SL ₂	$(pizza - 4 - DL_2, 4)$
sausage – SL ₁	$(pizza - 3 - DL_1, 3)$
ham — SL ₁	$(pizza - 4 - DL_1, 4)$

Retrieving documents (pizzas) with keyword (topping) *pineapple*: We would then use the result to identify which documents (pizzas) to retrieve.

Index	Document
1	Pizza Box
2	Pizza Box
3	Pizza Box
4	Pizza Box

Retrieving documents (pizzas) with keyword (topping) *pineapple*: We would then use the result to identify which documents (pizzas) to retrieve.

Index	Document	h
1	Pizza Box	1
2	Pizza Box	2
3	Pizza Box	3
4	Pizza Box	4

Index	Document
1	Pepperoni Pizza
2	Pepperoni Pineapple Pizza
3	Sausage Pizza
4	Ham Pineapple Pizza

Privacy After Searches

Privacy After Searches


Recall: Forward private if queries to the server don't reveal which keywords are involved in the keyword/document pairs.

Dual Dictionary switches keys after every search

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Dual Dictionary switches keys after every search



Privacy

Recall: Backward private if search queries on the database don't reveal information about documents that were deleted.

Privacy

Recall: Backward private if search queries on the database don't reveal information about documents that were deleted. The Dual Dictionary scheme isn't backward private. This is because further search queries would reveal the documents that were deleted.

Searchable Encryption Schemes

Fides

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Fides is a forward and backward private searchable encryption scheme.

It is a combination of:

- $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$ a forward private scheme
- Two-roundtrip a technique for backward privacy



Key features of $\sum o\psi o\zeta$: Forward privacy through tokens



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Forward privacy through tokens

 Search token - generated by the number of documents matching a given keyword with a one-way trapdoor permutation

Key features of $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$:

Forward privacy through tokens

- Search token generated by the number of documents matching a given keyword with a one-way trapdoor permutation
 - The client keeps the most recent search token (ST_n)
 - The client can generate a new search token (ST_{n+1}) based on an old one (ST_n)
 - The server given ST_n , can derive ST_{n-1} to ST_0 but not ST_{n+1}

Key features of $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$:

Forward privacy through tokens

- Search token generated by the number of documents matching a given keyword with a one-way trapdoor permutation
 - The client keeps the most recent search token (ST_n)
 - The client can generate a new search token (ST_{n+1}) based on an old one (ST_n)
 - The server given ST_n , can derive ST_{n-1} to ST_0 but not ST_{n+1}
- Update token generated to correspond to 1 search token and are paired with a document index



Key features of Two-Roundtrip:

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- documents aren't returned in a query
- ciphertext containing the document index and operation is returned

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- documents aren't returned in a query
- ciphertext containing the document index and operation is returned
 - ciphertext encrypted by the client with a key
 - key is unique for each keyword
 - operation is addition or deletion



How Fides Functions Differently from $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$:

How Fides Functions Differently from $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$:

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Step	Client		Server
1	Search Token	\rightarrow	Calculate Search Tokens
2			Find Indexes with Correspond-
			ing Update Tokens
3		\leftarrow	Documents

$\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$ Scheme

How Fides Functions Differently from $\Sigma o \psi o \zeta$:

Σοψοζ Scheme

Step	Client		Server
1	Search Token	\rightarrow	Calculate Search Tokens
2			Find Indexes with Correspond-
			ing Update Tokens
3		\leftarrow	Documents

Fides First Trip

Step	Client		Server
1	Search Token	\rightarrow	Calculate Search Tokens
2			Find Ciphertext with Corre-
			sponding Update Tokens
3	Decrypt Cipher-	\leftarrow	Ciphertext
	text		人口 医小脑 医小脑 医小脑

How Fides works:

	First Trip		
Step	Client		Server
1	Search Token	\rightarrow	Calculate Search Tokens
2			Find Ciphertext with Corre-
			sponding Update Tokens
3	Decrypt Cipher- text	\leftarrow	Ciphertext
	text		

Second Trip

Step	Client		Server
4	Indexes and New	\rightarrow	Update Ciphertext
	Ciphertext		
5		\leftarrow	Documents

How Fides works:

Update Token	Ciphertext
pepperoni 1	e(1, ADD)
pepperoni 2	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 1	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 2	<i>e</i> (4, <i>ADD</i>)
sausage 1	<i>e</i> (3, <i>ADD</i>)
ham 1	<i>e</i> (4, <i>ADD</i>)

Index	Document
1	Pizza Box
2	Pizza Box
3	Pizza Box
4	Pizza Box

How Fides works:

If we searched for pineapple

Update Token	Ciphertext
pepperoni 1	e(1, ADD)
pepperoni 2	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 1	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 2	e(4, ADD)
sausage 1	<i>e</i> (3, <i>ADD</i>)
ham 1	<i>e</i> (4, <i>ADD</i>)

Index	Document	
1	Pizza Box	
2	Pizza Box	
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How Fides works:

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Update Token	Ciphertext
pepperoni 1	e(1, ADD)
pepperoni 2	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 1	e(2, ADD)
pineapple 2	e(4, ADD)
sausage 1	e(3, ADD)
ham 1	<i>e</i> (4, <i>ADD</i>)

Index	Document
1	Pizza Box
2	Pizza Box
3	Pizza Box
4	Pizza Box

How Fides works:

If we searched for pineapple

Index	Document	Index	Document
1	Pizza Box	1	Pepperoni Pizza
2	Pizza Box	2	Pepperoni Pineapple Pizza
3	Pizza Box	3	Sausage Pizza
4	Pizza Box	4	Ham Pineapple Pizza





Forward Private:



Forward Private:

- the server doesn't know what keyword can be used for specific documents
- token system

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Backward Private with Update Pattern:

Forward Private:

- the server doesn't know what keyword can be used for specific documents
- token system

Backward Private with Update Pattern:

- The server knows when updates occur, but not their content
- two-roundtrip ciphertext

Searchable Encryption Schemes

<u>Janus</u>

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Janus is a scheme that uses:



Janus

Janus is a scheme that uses:

- Any forward private scheme
- Puncturable Encryption
- Incremental Puncture

Puncturable Encryption and Incremental Puncture:

- Imagine having a key ring with all the keys to a building
- These keys can be taken off of the ring
- Security at the entrance can make you take off certain keys
 - We will call the instructions to take off keys a key part



How Janus is set up:

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- Uses 2 instances of the forward private scheme
 - Used for additions stores a pair of keyword and encrypted index
 - Used for deletion stores a pair of keyword and key part (which key to take off the ring)

How Janus is set up:

- Uses 2 instances of the forward private scheme
 - Used for additions stores a pair of keyword and encrypted index
 - Used for deletion stores a pair of keyword and key part (which key to take off the ring)
- Each keyword has its own puncturable key (key ring)
 - the client stores the full key ring for each of these keys

An example of what our database would look like:

Keyword	Encry	pted Ind	dexes				
pepperoni	e(1)]			
pepperoni	e(2)				K	eyword	Key Part
pineapple	e(2)					ey word	Reyran
pineapple	<i>e</i> (4)						
sausage	e(3)						
ham	e(4)						
		Index	Docι	ime	nt		
		1	Pizza	a Bo	ох		
		2	Pizza	a Bo	ox		
		3	Pizza	a Bo	ox		
		4	Pizza	a Bo	ox]	

How Janus inserts new documents:

How Janus inserts new documents: For example: a ham pizza How Janus inserts new documents:

For example: a ham pizza

- Client encrypts the new document's index with the key corresponding to its keyword
- Document is then sent to the database
- Keyword and encrypted-index pair is inserted in the addition instance

How Janus inserts new documents:

Keyword	Encrypted Indexes
pepperoni	e(1)
pepperoni	e(2)
pineapple	e(2)
pineapple	e(4)
sausage	<i>e</i> (3)
ham	<i>e</i> (4)
ham	e(5)

Index	Document
1	Pizza Box
2	Pizza Box
3	Pizza Box
4	Pizza Box
5	Pizza Box



How Janus deletes documents:

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Keyword	Key Part	
Ham	sk1 ^{ham}	

How Janus searches documents:

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Keyword	Encrypted Indexes	
pepperoni	e(1, sfadsa)	
pepperoni	e(2, affdsa)	
pineapple	e(2, lykuty)	
pineapple	e(4, lfggry)	
sausage	e(3, gregff)	
ham	e(4, ytrhgg)	
ham	e(5, yiperg)	

Keyword	Key Part		
ham	${\it sk_1^{ham}}$		

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- The server:
 - obtains the encrypted indexes from the addition instance
 - obtains the corresponding key parts from the deletion instance

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Keyword	Key Part		
ham	sk1 ^{ham}		

- The server:
 - obtains the encrypted indexes from the addition instance
 - obtains the corresponding key parts from the deletion instance
 - can then remove the required keys from the key ring and decrypt the indexes that it still has keys for

How Janus searches documents:

Keyword	Encrypted Indexes		
pepperoni	e(1)	Index	Document
pepperoni	e(2)	1	Pizza Box
pineapple	e(2)	2	Pizza Box
pineapple	e(4)	3	Pizza Box
sausage	e(3)	4	Pizza Box
ham	e(4)	5	Pizza Box
ham	e(5)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,

• With this, the server can retrieve one document

How Janus searches documents:

Index	Document
1	Pizza Box
2	Pizza Box
3	Pizza Box
4	Pizza Box
5	Pizza Box

Index	Document		
1	Pepperoni Pizza		
2	Pepperoni Pineapple Pizza		
3	Sausage Pizza		
4	Ham Pineapple Pizza		
5	Ham Pizza		

After Janus searches documents:

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The server has now learned the indexes matching a keyword and its secret key.

 For security any future insertions of that keyword will be encrypted with a new key

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Keyword	Indexes
ham	4



Privacy

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Privacy

Forward Privacy:

The scheme is forward private because it requires the use of a forward private scheme

Privacy

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Backward Privacy:

The scheme has weak backward privacy, because:

- The server only has access to the key ring during a search query
- The key ring used for a keyword changes after every search

So, deleted indexes remain hidden. However, the server is able to tell which inserted entries were later deleted.



Janus' Other Privacy Considerations

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Janus' Other Privacy Considerations

Janus is vulnerable to weaker adversaries.

- Persistent constantly monitors from the beginning
- Late Persistent constantly monitors from a given point in time
- Snapshot only gets to view the database at one given point in time

Conclusions

SE Scheme	FP	BP	Other Considerations
Dual Dict.	\checkmark	V	Two dictionaries takes twice
		×	the space
Fides	\checkmark	With update	Two roundtrips increases com-
		pattern	munication cost
Janus	\checkmark	Weak	Vulnerable to weak adversaries

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Elena Machkasova, my senior seminar professor and advisor



Questions?

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