


# Assessing Flaws in CAPTCHA Security through Progress in AI

Jaydon Stanislawski  
University of Minnesota Morris



# Outline

1. Introduction to CAPTCHAs
2. Modern CAPTCHAs
3. Reinforcement Learning
4. Attacking reCAPTCHA v3
5. Threat Analysis
6. Conclusion

# 1. Introduction to CAPTCHA

- What is a CAPTCHA?
- Motivation
- Early CAPTCHAs




# What is a CAPTCHA?

- **CAPTCHA** - Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
  - **Turing test** - a thought experiment, measures machine intelligence with a human evaluator (Turing, 1950)
- Tasks designed to be simple for humans, but hard for AI models
- Designed by Luis von Ahn et al. in the early 2000s

# Motivation

- Artificial web traffic can have various malicious motives:
  - Credential stuffing/brute force attacks
  - Fake account creation and engagement
  - Spam, extortion
  - Web scraping
- Despite this, it is more prevalent than ever



Area chart depicting the rise in artificial web traffic since 2015. | The Independent  
(adapted from Imperva 2025 Bad Bot Report)

# Early CAPTCHAs

## Text-based challenges:

- Participants must transcribe text
- Text is typically distorted to make it hard for machines to read
- Random noise, warping, rotating, etc.



# Early CAPTCHAs

- **reCAPTCHA**: version 1 began as text-based
  - Developed by Luis von Ahn et al. in 2007
  - Acquired by Google two years later
- Other text-based frameworks included Gimpy, hCAPTCHA, etc.
- reCAPTCHA v1 deprecated in 2018. reCAPTCHA v3 is the latest version



## 2. Modern CAPTCHAs


- Common Types
- reCAPTCHA v3
- Why reCAPTCHA?



# Common Types

Many challenge types exist now,  
but are outside of the scope of this  
presentation

- Image-based challenges
- Audio-based challenges
- Spatial reasoning challenges




# reCAPTCHA v3

- Intended to reduce friction for real users, removing the actual "challenge," entirely invisible
- Uses **behavior metrics**, calculates likelihood of a bot based on browser activity (cookies, inputs, etc.), directly embedded into site interactions
- Earlier version, reCAPTCHA v2, did this using a checkbox challenge (i.e. not invisible)

# reCAPTCHA v3

1. reCAPTCHA v3 is invoked, the website sends metrics and invocation context to Google's servers, collected by the tool
2. Google generates a token to be verified by the site


reCAPTCHA v3 workflow | Joosen et al.



# reCAPTCHA v3

3. The token is sent to the web server
4. The server verifies the token with the site's key and sends this to Google
5. Google returns a formatted score, which can be used by the website to take necessary actions

reCAPTCHA v3 workflow | Joosen et al.



# reCAPTCHA v3

## Considerations:


- Code is proprietary, details are intentionally obfuscated
- Calculations may be randomly skewed to deter probing
- Score itself is not descriptive, only a discrete number  
 $\{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9\}$
- Lower score means more likely to be a bot

# Why reCAPTCHA?

- Over 10 million websites as of 2025 (BuiltWith)
  - This includes GitHub, Reddit, Amazon, and more
- Designs of reCAPTCHA v3 are applied in other CAPTCHA frameworks
  - Notably, Turnstile and newer versions of hCAPTCHA



### 3. Reinforcement Learning






# Overview

- Machine learning paradigm
- Employed when computers interact with an environment
  - Applications in robotics, social media algorithms, strategy games, etc.
- Agent is given a set of actions to do so, choices are initially random

# Overview


- The agent observes its current state to alter chance of making decisions
- Reward score influences these changes, agent must try to maximize it



Block diagram modeling basic principles of reinforcement learning | Tizhoosh, Taylor

## 4. Attacking reCAPTCHA v3

- Bypassing Behavior Metrics
- Results



# Bypassing Behavior Metrics

- Browser activity that may be measured (Joosen et al., 2022):
  - **Static features:** presence of cookies, IP address, browser, operating system, etc.
  - **Dynamic features:** mouse and keyboard inputs, timings, request frequency
- reCAPTCHA v3 obscures how much these are measured

# Bypassing Behavior Metrics

Static features:

- Sivakorn et al. (2016) determined static features to have a very strong positive influence on score
- In such cases, dynamic features have very minimal effect
- Goal of this research is to exploit dynamic features starting from a low score

# Bypassing Behavior Metrics

Measuring dynamic features:

- Treating the score as an "oracle" — specific states of the environment aren't needed. Instead, fine tune behaviors based on the output
- The RL agent makes assumptions about its environment and learns accordingly

# Bypassing Behavior Metrics

- Joosen et al. trained their bot on three websites:
  - **Website A:** hosted by researchers, implementing reCAPTCHA v3; training only
  - **Website B:** hundreds of daily requests, only recently deployed reCAPTCHA v3; partial training
  - **Website C:** thousands of daily requests, already fully integrated reCAPTCHA v3; full deployment


# Bypassing Behavior Metrics

- Two modes of the bot were deployed in testing to assess score impact of dynamic features
- *Bezier*: Can only move mouse in curved patterns and click, as well as time mouse inputs, hover duration, etc.
- *Abstract*: Freedom over mouse movements and timings, plus keyboard inputs and scrolling



# Results

- A baseline (naive) algorithm was used to assess score improvement via RL
- *Bezier* and *Abstract* deployed on B, with *Abstract* in its training mode



Average cumulative score over the period of evaluation for Website B | Joosen et al.

# Results

- On website C, researchers did not have access to the score. Intended to test *Abstract*'s capabilities in a fully black-box environment
- Success measured by **evasion rate**, frequency of v3 seeming to detect no bot activity
- Evaluated for both high starting sessions (presence of static features) and low starting sessions

# Results

- *Abstract* almost perfectly avoided detection with static features
- Starting from a low score with minimal static data, *Abstract* succeeded at a rate of  $\sim 70\%$

|       | Website C |          |
|-------|-----------|----------|
|       | Baseline  | Abstract |
| $S_L$ | 20.8%     | 70.1%    |
| $S_H$ | 84.3%     | 99.6%    |

Evasion rate (in %) for both the *Baseline* and *Abstract* algorithms across different session types | Joosen et al.

# Analysis

- Research Implications
- Limitations
- Future of CAPTCHA Tools
- Ethical Considerations



# Research Implications

- The results suggest that providing a CAPTCHA score is a vulnerability, can be exploited to:
  - Train machines to receive a passing score
  - Probe what behavior data is being measured

# Research Implications

CAPTCHAs based on these metrics may be insecure as a whole:

- They are easily bypassed by models trained to mimic human browsing
- They are apparently biased in favor of static variables easily accounted for by attackers

# Limitations

- reCAPTCHA v3 is known to intentionally add random noise, obscuring the meaning of the score
- Models cannot remain active over long periods of time, since excessive number of requests influences the score
- Not accounting for combining CAPTCHA schemes or using different metrics-based CAPTCHA tools

# Limitations

- reCAPTCHA v3 likely employs adversarial learning
- More study of how the tool has changed over time is needed, could improve or remain the same
- This also makes past experiments harder to replicate



# Future of CAPTCHA Tools

- CAPTCHA tools may pivot to more complex challenges for humans, possibly focusing more on spatial reasoning and logic puzzles (many do already)
- Current CAPTCHAs using behavior metrics may improve over time, but so will AI models to bypass them

# Future of CAPTCHA Tools

- Von Ahn et al. designed CAPTCHAs with the intention of being broken
  - As AI evolves, breaking CAPTCHA schemes is proof of progress in the field
  - CAPTCHA will always change as breakthroughs occur, but for how long will this remain effective?

# Ethical Considerations

Responsible disclosure:

- Researchers received permission from website owners before deploying their bots
- Google was notified of these security concerns. The issue was closed as intended behavior, likely considered to be a "reasonable limitation" of the tool

# Conclusion

- CAPTCHA security is an important but persistent problem as AI becomes more sophisticated
- Today's Captcha tools face challenges that reduce their effectiveness, but will continue to grow over time

Questions?

# References

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